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ABSTRACT
Previous research has indicated that moderate 
levels of suspicion will enhance deception detection 
accuracy. This study hypothesized that combining 
state suspicion and trait suspicion (i.e. antisocial 
personality traits) in order to create a moderate 
level of suspicion overall would produce a higher 
detection accuracy than would be found among 
individuals who were not suspicious. Participants 
consisted of 133 UNLV undergraduates, who completed 
the Antisocial subscale of the Milion Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory-II. Participants were assigned 
to a no suspicion or moderate suspicion condition, 
viewed a videotape of persons being truthful or 
deceptive, judged videotape actors as being truthful 
or untruthful, and rated their own degree of 
suspicion. Results did not confirm the original 
hypothesis, but did indicate that persons high in 
antisocial traits were more suspicious than those low 
in such traits, and subjects not primed to be 
suspicious made more veracity judgments than those 
who were primed to be suspicious.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Deception can be defined as any intentional 
verbal or nonverbal act performed for the purpose of 
directing another away from the "truth", as 
conceptualized by the deceiver (Riggio & Friedman,
1983). Essentially every person has deceived another 
at some point in their lives, whether it involved an 
exaggeration of truth, a statement of only partial 
truth, a simple white lie, or a boldfaced lie of 
serious magnitude (Ford, King & Hollander, 1988). 
Deception lies embedded in nearly every type of 
interpersonal relationship, occurring among friends, 
family members, lovers, colleagues, and strangers 
(Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981) . The impact 
of such deception may potentially affect 
occupational, familial, social, and psychological 
functioning.
A large body of research has examined the 
ability of humans to detect deception, and found that 
in general, human accuracy in detecting deception is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
low. Prior studies have reported accuracy scores 
seldom above 65 percent, with 50 percent being the 
chance level. Accuracy scores for individual studies 
include the following: Harrison et al., 1978, 62
percent; Kraut & Poe, 1980, 46 percent; Lavrakas & 
Maier, 1979, 54 percent; Maier & Janzen, 1967, 61 
percent; Maier & Thurber, 1968, 72 percent ; and 
Matarazzo et al., 1970, 59 percent.
Obviously, there exists many circumstances when 
an individual is better off deciphering the truth 
than being deceived, particularly when the sender is 
acting in a way that will be harmful, insulting, or 
otherwise damaging to the receiver (DePaulo et al.,
1984). The ability to detect deception becomes 
increasingly important when it can be used to prevent 
such harmul actions. Therefore, discovering the true 
effects of influential variables in deception 
detection is not only a matter of theoretical 
importance, but also of practical importance.
Several factors play an important role in an 
individual's ability to detect deception, including 
the interpretation of behavioral cues that are leaked 
by the deceiver, as well as detector experience, 
familiarity, age, personality, and level of 
suspicion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Behavioral Correlates of Deception
Behavioral correlates of deception have often 
been examined in deception research. There are 
several factors that may cause a deceiver to produce 
cues that lead to his or her detection. Four main 
factors include emotion, arousal, control, and 
cognitive processing (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
Two emotional states generally associated with 
lie telling include guilt and anxiety (e.g., Knapp 
et al., 1974; Kraut, 1980). Since guilt and anxiety 
are both negative emotions, persons engaging in 
deception may manifest negative behaviors associated 
with such emotions. For example, facial and vocal 
cues may become less pleasant (Zuckerman et al.,
1981), and negative statements are often made more 
often. Another indicator of anxiety is the use 
"adaptors" (Ekman & Friesen, 1972), which are 
behaviors designed to satisfy some self-need, such as 
scratching or grooming. In order to minimize the 
negative experience of lie telling, an individual may 
attempt to dissociate himself or herself from the lie 
by making fewer self-references, or by becoming 
withdrawn or evasive. This is indicated by 
attempting to change the conversation, decreasing eye
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
contact, and increasing the distance from the 
individual being deceived.
A second major factor contributing to a 
deceiver's behavioral manifestations is that of 
psychophysiological arousal (e.g., Lykken, 1974; 
Podlesny & Raskin, 1977; Waid & Orne, 1981) . Such 
arousal may produce increased heart rate, increased 
sweat production, pupil dilation, and increased blood 
pressure. Davis (1961) suggests that the arousal 
occuring during deception can be explained by three 
possibilities: the conditioned response theory, the
punishment theory, and the conflict theory. The 
conditioned response theory suggests that telling a 
lie produces an autonomic response because in the 
past, lying has been conditioned to negative 
consequences. Punishment theory explains the 
increased autonomic responsivity by linking it to 
anticipated punishment if the lie is detected. The 
conflict theory claims the enhanced autonomic 
response results from a consequence of conflicting 
truth and lie telling tendencies. Assuming that 
deception does evoke increased arousal, a review of 
studies by Zuckerman et al. (1981) suggests that 
aside from psychophysiological arousal, deception is 
also associated with increased eyeblink rate.
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increased voice pitch, and a large number of speech 
errors and hesitations.
A third factor related to the behavioral cues of 
deception is attempted control. Such controlled 
behavior may appear rehearsed, planned, and lacking 
in spontaneity (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
Additionally, individuals engaging in deception may 
"try too hard", and thus produce a performance that 
is too smooth or excessive (Knapp et al., 1974). 
Furthermore, if deceivers are unable to control all 
channels simultaneously, discrepancies are likely to 
occur; for instance, face and voice or face and body 
expressions may appear to convey different messages 
(Zuckerman et al., 1981). Such channel effects in 
the detection of deception specifically refer to the 
modes by which cues to deception are "leaked" by the 
deceiver, and subsequently used by the detector in 
deciding whether or not deception is occuring. The 
facial channel includes facial cues above the neck, 
the body channel includes cues from the neck down, 
the face and body channel includes cues examined from 
only a partial view of the upper body, and the speech 
channel includes examinations of deceivers' unaltered 
speech (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Ekman and Friesen 
(1969a) found that when individuals used facial cues
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
while attempting to detect deception, their accuracy 
was actually lower than detection attempted without 
the use of facial cues. A review of studies by 
Zuckerman et al. (1981) found that when body cues 
become available to the detector, accuracy does 
increase, and when speech cues become available, 
accuracy increases even more. Comparing face, body, 
and speech cues as single channels reveals the 
following order of detection accuracy in standard 
deviation units : speech (1.09), body (.43), and face
(.05) (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
A variable that may influence a deceiver's 
attempted control and arousal, and thereby affect his 
or her manifestations of behavioral cues is that of 
motivation. The evidence relating to the effects of 
motivation on a deceiver is, however, inconclusive.
A highly motivated deceiver may try harder and 
therefore be more successful at deceiving, or the 
increased motivation could produce increased anxiety 
which may interfere with successful deception (e.g., 
DePaulo, Davis, & Lanier, 1980). Alternatively, the 
less motivated liar may not do well at masking the 
deceptive information, but he or she may be less 
likely to leak deception cues (Zuckerman et al.,
1981). This suggests that the relationship between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deception ability and motivation may be curvilinear, 
with optimum performance at an intermediate level, 
where deceivers are somewhat motivated to 
successfully lie, but not too highly aroused where 
they will leak deception cues (Zuckerman et al.,
1981) .
Finally, cognitive factors influence a 
deceiver's behavior by causing more cues to leak as 
cognitive complexity increases. Quite obviously, 
creating a lie, much less the details of a lie, is 
more difficult than telling the truth. A deceiver 
must create a message that contains no logical 
inconsistencies or contradictions of what the 
detector may already know (Zuckerman et al., 1981) . 
Thus, individuals are expected to require more time 
to prepare deceptive messages as opposed to truthful 
ones. Goldman-Eis1er (1968) found that subjects who 
are required to make cognitively complex statements 
take more time to begin responding and hesitate more 
when speaking. Increased pupil dilation (Kahneman, 
1973) and decreased accompanying hand movements 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1972) have also been found to occur 
when an individual communicates cognitively complex 
messages. Assuming that lie telling is indeed a 
cognitively complex task, the aforementioned
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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behaviors should occur with increased frequency when 
a person engages in deception.
Reasons for Low Accuracy
Although lie telling is associated with certain 
behaviors, often such cues are interpreted the wrong 
way or are not even noticed (Riggio & Friedman,
1983). A review of studies by Zuckerman et al.
(1981), indicates that persons are perceived as being 
more deceptive when they shift their posture more, 
smile less, gaze less, take longer to answer a 
question, and speak slower. Accordingly, none of 
these behaviors are associated with actual deception 
in a statistically significant manner (Zuckerman et 
al., 1981). On the other hand, perceivers also tend 
to judge others as being more deceptive when the 
messages are filled with errors and hesitations, and 
delivered in a high-pitched tone of voice, all of 
which are associated with actual deception (Zuckerman 
et al., 1981). The lack of perfect correspondence 
between actual cues to deception and perceived cues 
to deception has important implications for both 
truth-tellers and liars (DePaulo et al., 1984).
First, perhaps simply telling the truth is not 
sufficient if one wants to be perceived as being 
honest. Certain individuals may have to make a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conscious effort at appearing honest by changing 
their normal behavioral cues. Second, liars who wish 
to effectively deceive others need only be aware of 
cues that others may perceive as signs of deception, 
rather than cues that really are associated with 
deception (DePaulo et al., 1984).
Conversely, for detectors of deception, actual 
cues are obviously more important that perceived cues 
to deception. An important step in training 
individuals to become more accurate at detecting 
deception would be educating them of the 
discrepancies between perceived and actual cues to 
deception. Increasing awareness of such 
discrepancies would call attention to common 
judgmental errors (DePaulo et al., 1984), and should 
therefore improve detection accuracy. It is 
unlikely, however, that detectors will learn of such 
discrepancies through their own experience, since 
it's probably unlikely that they will receive 
accurate evidence that the sender is actually telling 
a lie (DePaulo et al., 1984). Even if such feedback 
is available, receivers may selectively focus on and 
remember those behaviors that were parallel with 
their own "theory" of how people act when they're 
lying (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). In the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
laboratory, however, it is possible to draw subjects' 
attention to possible revealing sources of cues to 
deception, and to directly test such effects on 
detection accuracy. DePaulo, Lassiter, and Stone
(1982) performed a study in which subjects were 
divided into groups, each of which was instructed to 
pay attention to specific cues. Subjects in one 
group were told to pay particular attention to words. 
Subjects in another group were given a booklet that 
suggested they pay particular attention to tone of 
voice. The third group was instructed to attend to 
visual cues, while a control group was given no 
special instructions. All subjects then watched 
videotapes of senders who were both telling the truth 
and lying. The attend-to-tone subjects had the best 
performance on the subsequent lie detection task, 
performing significantly better than controls, and 
followed closely by the attend-to-words group. The 
attend-to-visual subjects did no better than controls 
on the detection task. This study suggests that 
prompting subjects to take advantage of particular 
cues to deception can improve lie detection accuracy. 
Experience _and Detection Accuracy
Although behavioral cues serve as important 
factors in the detection of deception, experience in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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detection seems to play a less prominent role. Kraut 
and Poe (1980) examined differences in detection 
accuracy on the basis of experience by setting up 
mock customs examinations. They evaluated the 
differences between experienced customs inspectors 
and laypersons in their decisions to search 
travelers, some of whom were "smugglers". Using 
verbal and nonverbal cues, the subjects were to 
identify those individuals they believed were 
smugglers, as evidenced by their decision to search 
those travellers. It was found that customs 
inspectors were no more accurate than laypersons in 
deciding which travellers to search. Additionally, 
customs inspectors who had made the largest number of 
seizures in the previous year were no more accurate 
in deciding who to search than the less successful 
ones. Similarly, Hendershot and Hess (1982) 
conducted a study in which undergraduates and police 
detectives observed interrogations of students who 
had or had not committed a mock crime, and found that 
the detectives were no more accurate than 
undergraduates in their judgments of innocence or 
guilt.
Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) examined differences 
in detection accuracy among various occupational
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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groups. A videotape consisting of ten people either 
lying or telling the truth was shown to 509 
individuals. These included members of the U.S. 
Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
Drug Enforcement Agency, California police officers 
and judges, as well as working adults, psychiatrists, 
and college students. Subjects were to correctly 
differentiate deceivers from non-deceivers after 
viewing the videotape. It was found that only the 
Secret Service agents were significantly more 
accurate than the others in detecting deception. 
Publicness of Interactions
Another factor that influences deception 
detection accuracy is the publicness of the 
interaction. Several investigators have suggested 
that people tend to act differently in public versus 
private situations; specifically, people tend to 
control their behavior more carefully in public 
situations (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Ekman & Friesen 
(1969b) proposed the term "display rules" for the 
norms that control appropriate public behavior. In 
deceptive communication, public (face-to-face) 
situations offer a special advantage to the deceiver, 
who can change his or her deceptive strategy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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according to the perceiver's reactions (Krauss et 
al., 1976). Thus, it appears that deceiving another 
individual is easier and detecting such deception is 
more difficult in a public interaction. Krauss et 
al. (1976) had deceivers and interviewers interact 
either face-to-face or by an intercom system. 
Deception detection accuracy was higher in the 
intercom condition, particularly when interviewers 
could observe deceivers' faces. Since the deceivers 
in the intercom condition knew that their voices were 
being monitored but did not know they were being 
observed, they may have controlled their voices while 
neglecting to control their facial expressions 
(DePaulo, 1980). In another study that examined cue 
leakage in public and private interactions, Feldman 
et al. (1979) found that when subjects were asked to 
lie about their taste of a sample beverage, they 
experienced greater leakage of their true opinion in 
the private condition than in the public condition.
On a related note, Buller et al. (1991) found that 
conversational participants attributed more truth to 
interviewees than observers did. The experiment was 
designed to compare deception detection skills of 
conversational (face-to-face) participants and 
observers of such interactions. Each of fifty
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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observers viewed videotaped interactions between an 
interviewer (conversational participant) and two 
interviewees. Conversational participants were found 
to be less accurate than observers in the detection 
of deception. It appears that detection accuracy is 
higher when the detector and deceiver do not engage 
in face-to-face, direct contact (Zuckerman et al., 
1981) .
Age and Deception Detection
Detector age is another variable that may 
influence deception detection accuracy. Children are 
generally not as adept as adults in detecting 
deception because understanding the concept of 
deception is a process that develops over the course 
of the elementary school years. It takes time for 
children to realize that people's overt expressions 
do not always coincide with their internal states 
(DePaulo et al., 1984). Deception detectors must 
also l e a m  defining features of a lie : it is a
message that the deceiver knows is false, and it is 
designed to mislead (DePaulo et al., 1984). 
Additionally, children must learn behavioral cues to 
deception and l e a m  to recognize when those cues are 
occuring. Even when nonsubtle cues are presented to 
children, considerable difficulties remain in their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ability to detect deception (Winner, Rosenstiel, & 
Gardner, 1976). Inconsistencies between different 
aspects of a message (i.e. verbal versus nonverbal) 
are often not apparent to children, and even when 
they are, the tactics used to resolve such 
discrepancies are very different than those used by 
adults (DePaulo et al., 1984). Children's difficulty 
in resolving inconsistent cues has sometimes been 
attributed to their limited capacity to process 
information, and to their increased willingness to 
accept adults' statements as true and credible 
(DePaulo et al., 1984). Skepticism about the 
credibility of adults' statements does increase with 
age (Ackerman, 1983). There is also evidence that 
suggests that throughout adolescence, individuals are 
continually gaining new skills, experience, and 
strategies that facilitate lie detection accuracy, 
such as cultural, social, and interpersonal knowledge 
(DePaulo et al., 1984). DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, and 
Laser (1981) tested deception detection abilities in 
sixth-, eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-graders and 
college students. Results showed a linear increase 
in detection accuracy as age increased.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Familiarity and Deception Detection
Another variable related to detection accuracy 
is the degree of familiarity between receivers and 
senders. Miller et al. (1986) suggested that having 
truthful baseline information may be necessary for 
accurate deception detection, since much deceptive 
behavior is idiosyncratic. Thus, it is expected that 
as individuals become more familiar with each other, 
or as a relationship develops, the ability to detect 
deception should increase. For instance, Knapp 
(1984) hypothesized that detection accuracy would be 
higher between intimates than between friends, and 
higher between friends than between acquaintances.
Yet research supporting this hypothesis is limited. 
Two general procedures have been used in studies 
examining the effects of baseline information on 
judgments of truthfulness (Stiff et al., 1992). One 
such procedure involves exposing observers to samples 
of a target's truthful behavior, and thereby 
experimentally manipulating familiarity. Brandt, 
Miller, and Hocking (1980a, 1980b, 1982) performed 
several studies that utilized this procedure, which 
basically defines "familiarity" as exposure to 
different amounts of truthful information. In one of 
these studies (1980b), Brandt et al. compared
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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detection accuracy of observers who had not seen a 
videotape of the target's truthful behavior to the 
accuracy of observers who had viewed the videotape 
three times. Results did show a significant positive 
effect for familiarity (65.6 percent mean accuracy in 
the familiarity condition as compared to 42 percent 
mean accuracy in the no-familiarity condition). In 
another study (1982), Brandt et al. showed the 
videotape of targets' truthful behavior either two, 
one, or zero times to observers before veracity 
judgments were made. Results showed that subjects 
who had viewed the baseline videotape once or twice 
were significantly more accurate than those subjects 
who had not seen the videotape. A similar third 
study (1980a) by Brandt and associates examined 
individuals who had seen a truthful videotaped 
segment zero, one, three, or six times. Across the 
first three conditions, detection accuracy increased 
with familiarity; however, subjects who had viewed 
the segment six times were only slightly more 
accurate than subjects who had not seen the segment 
at all. Overall, the Brandt, Miller, and Hocking 
studies offer some evidence that increased 
familiarity increases deception detection accuracy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The second general procedure for studying 
familiarity and detection accuracy examines 
familiarity in the context of natural relationship 
development. Comadena (1982) compared the accuracy 
of friendship dyads and married couples in detecting 
lies about both emotional and factual material. It 
was found that spouses were significantly more 
accurate at detecting deception than friends, 
regardless of the type of lie. Miller et al. (1981) 
examined detection accuracy between spouses, close 
friends, and strangers concerning truthful or 
deceptive responses to a videotape. Interestingly, 
it was found that friends were significantly more 
accurate than spouses or strangers when judging 
emotional material, and that spouses, strangers, and 
friends were no different in their ability to detect 
deception relating to factual material. In general, 
studies which have investigated the influence of 
familiarity on deception detection accuracy have not 
found strong evidence for the presumed increase in 
detection accuracy between individuals with a high 
degree of familiarity.
Suspicion and Detection Accuracy
A number of studies have investigated the 
effects of suspicion on deception detection
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accuracy. While it is often assumed that 
situationally-induced suspicion will improve an 
individual's ability to detect deception, previous 
research has produced mixed results.
Toris and Depaulo (1985) set up a mock interview 
situation, in which applicants acted either honestly 
or dishonestly in presenting themselves as introverts 
or extroverts. Some interviewers were primed to be 
suspicious, whereas the others were not. No 
significant relationship between suspicion and 
accuracy in detecting deception was found. However, 
subjects who were primed to be suspicious were more 
likely to judge their partner as being deceptive.
Similar results were found by Stiff, Kim, and 
Ramesh (1992) in studying the effects of suspicion on 
deception detection accuracy between relational 
partners. One partner was assigned the role of 
interviewee, who was either truthful or deceptive 
regarding his or her emotional reaction to a video. 
The other partner was given the role of interviewer, 
who was either primed or not primed to be suspicious. 
Following the video presentation, the interviewer 
made judgments regarding his or her partner's 
truthfulness regarding the emotional reaction. 
Although increased suspicion lead to greater
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judgments of deception, it did not improve accuracy 
in detecting deception.
McComack and Levine (1990) argued that the 
"all-or-none" approach to operationalizing suspicion 
may not be sufficient in discovering its true effect 
on detecting deception. Prior studies using a 
prime/no prime suspicion manipulation have found no 
effect for suspicion on accuracy, perhaps because the 
true relationship is non-linear. Individuals who are 
not primed to be suspicious are likely to perceive 
all messages as truthful (McCornack & Parks, 1986), 
whereas individuals who are highly suspicious are 
likely to perceive all messages as deceptive (Levine 
Sc. McComack, 1989) . Thus, a comparison between the 
two groups should find no differences in accuracy, 
because all judgments will be affected by the 
respective bias. Consequently, McCornack and Levine 
(1990) hypothesized that individuals who are 
moderately suspicious will be more accurate than 
those who are minimally suspicious and those who are 
highly suspicious. The results were consistent with 
the hypothesis, indicating considerable 
curvi1inearity.
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Personality Characteristics Influencing Detection 
Accuracy
Although prior research has found that on 
average persons do not detect deception at better 
than chance levels, large individual differences do 
exist. That is, some subjects perform better than 
others. This suggests that there may be certain 
types of persons that have a superior ability to 
detect deception. Prior research on deception and 
individual differences has often focused on such 
variables as gender and self-monitoring.
McComack and Parks (1990) evaluated detection 
accuracy among 55 premarital dyads. Subjects viewed 
12 videotaped segments of their relational partner, 
who lied in half the segments and told the truth in 
the other half. Differences in detection accuracy 
were found for couples of different levels of 
intimacy, as well as for gender; women were 
consistently more accurate than men in discerning 
truth that lies within deception. Hall (1984) also 
found that women were more successful at decoding 
non-verbal cues to deception than men. Additionally, 
Maier and Lavrakas (1976) and DePaulo and Rosenthal 
(1979) found higher detection rates for female 
detectors. However, DePaulo et al. (1980) and
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Hocking et al. (1979) found detection accuracy to be 
lower for female detectors than for male detectors.
A few studies have examined self-monitoring in 
conjunction with ability to detect deception. A 
self-monitoring scale developed by Snyder (1974) not 
only measures the ability to control expressive 
behavior, but also measures sensitivity to the social 
behavior of others. Thus, high self-monitors should 
possess a superior ability to detect deception 
because they are more adept at "reading" the social 
behavior of others. A summary of studies indicates 
an increased accuracy in detecting deception among 
high self-monitors versus low self-monitors, but 
Zuckerman et al. (1981) states that this finding is 
not reliable (mean = .04, combined z = 1.13). 
Antisocial Personalities and Detection
The present study examines the possibility that 
individual differences in antisocial personality 
traits affect the ability to detect deception. 
Individuals who manifest a large number of antisocial 
personality traits could potentially be diagnosed 
with Antisocial Personality Disorder. According to 
the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 
these individuals generally disregard and violate the 
rights of others, as demonstrated by a failure to
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conform to social norms regarding lawful behavior, a 
reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, 
lack of remorse, consistent irresponsibility 
regarding major personal obligations, aggressiveness, 
impulsivity, and deceitfulness, as indicated by 
repeated lying, conning others, or using aliases 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). These 
persons are notorious for lying in order to avoid 
punishment, gain rewards, manipulate others, and 
sometimes for no reason at all (Doren, 1987). For 
some of these individuals, lying becomes the normal 
mode of interaction with others. They are skillful 
liars, who take pride in their ability to tell 
outrageous lies in a convincing manner (Wells, 1988). 
Some antisocial individuals live their lives as 
impostors, surviving by constantly telling one 
fantastic lie after another. They are "willing to go 
to great lengths to achieve the ultimate deception" 
(Wells, 1988, p. 847). Cleckley's (1982) classic 
description of antisocial behavior also recognizes 
constructs of untruthfulness and insincerity, as does 
nearly every description of antisocial persons.
There is good reason to believe that antisocial 
individuals are generally suspicious of others 
because they frequently deceive others. These
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persons are often interested in others in terms of 
how they can be used, and may have a tendency to 
project their own dishonest motives onto other 
people. They are aware of their own corrupted 
honesty, and therefore assume that everyone else acts 
as they do (Field, 1986). Assuming that antisocial 
individuals do not generally trust others, it 
logically follows that they are generally suspicious 
of others, Support for this can be found in a study 
conducted by Ekselius et al. (1994), who studied the 
trait of suspicion in association with various 
personality disorders. Evidence for the existence of 
trait suspicion was found for antisocial individuals.
Eresent Study
The present study investigated the effects of 
primed suspicion and the effects of antisocial 
personality traits (i.e. trait suspicion) on 
deception detection accuracy. It was hypothesized 
that the levels of antisocial personality traits and 
the levels of primed suspicion would interact. 
Individuals low in antisocial personality traits who 
were primed to be moderately suspicious and 
individuals high in antisocial personality traits who 
were not primed to be suspicious were expected to 
manifest a superior ability to detect deception than
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individuals in all other groups. Persons low in 
antisocial personality traits who were not primed to 
be suspicious were expected to possess poor deception 
detection accuracy because previous research has 
indicated that low levels of suspicion lead persons 
to perceive most messages as being truthful (Kraut & 
Higgins, 1984). The lack of trait suspicion and 
primed suspicion were expected to produce biased 
judgments in the direction of truthfulness, thus 
lowering overall accuracy. Persons high in 
antisocial personality traits who were primed to be 
moderately suspicious were also expected to possess 
poor deception detection accuracy because research 
has indicated that individuals who are highly 
suspicious are likely to perceive most messages as 
being deceptive (Levine & McCornack, 1989). The 
combination of trait suspicion and primed suspicion 
was expected to produce biased judgments in the 
direction of deception, thus lowering overall 
accuracy. Alternatively, individuals low in 
antisocial personality traits who were primed to be 
moderately suspicious were expected to possess a 
moderate level of suspicion overall, due to the 
absence of trait suspicion and presence of primed 
suspicion. Individuals high in antisocial
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personality traits who were not primed to be 
suspicious were also expected to possess a moderate 
level of suspicion overall, due to the presence of 
trait suspicion and absence of primed suspicion.
These latter two groups possessing moderate levels of 
suspicion were expected to manifest a superior 
ability to detect deception than individuals in all 
other groups.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that veracity 
judgments of individuals who were low in antisocial 
personality traits and low in suspicion would, in 
general, be more truthful than veracity judgments of 
individuals in the other groups, regardless of the 
actual accuracy of those judgments. This was 
hypothesized because individuals who possess low 
levels of suspicion are likely to perceive most 
messages as being truthful (Kraut & Higgins, 1984). 
Conversely, veracity judgments of individuals who 
were high in antisocial personality traits and who 
were primed to become moderately suspicious were 
expected to be more deceptive than veracity judgments 
of individuals in the other groups, regardless of the 
actual accuracy of those judgments. This was 
reasoned because individuals who are highly
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suspicious are likely to perceive most messages as 
being deceptive (Levine & McCornack, 1989).




Participants consisted of 133 college 
undergraduates (4 7 men and 86 women) attending the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The mean age of 
participants was 22.7 years. The sample was 67% 
Caucasian, 12% Asian, 9% Hispanic, 7% African- 
American, and 5% other. Participation allowed 
students to fulfill course requirements in an 
introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
Materials used included a 45-item antisocial 
personality scale (Millon, 1990), three videotapes 
comprised of eight segments, and a brief adjective 
checklist to assess deception detection accuracy.
The antisocial personality scale was composed of all 
items that comprise the Antisocial subscale (Scale 
6A) of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II 
(MCMI-II; Millon, 1990; see Appendix I). The items 
relate to various antisocial dispositional traits.
28
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including one item directly associated with 
deceiving: "Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of
trouble". The median base rate score for psychiatric 
patients on this scale is 60, and the median base 
rate score for "normal" individuals is 35.
Internal consistency for nonclinical subjects on 
Scale 6A has been found to be approximately .88 
(Millon, 1987). Support for the external validity of 
Scale 6A has been measured by the classification 
efficacy associated with DSM-III-R (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987) diagnosed Axis II 
disorders. Positive predictive power for the MCMI-II 
was found to lie at 68%, negative predictive power at 
98%, and overall diagnostic power at 97% (Millon, 
1987). External validity of Scale 6A has also been 
supported by the Millon Personality Diagnostic 
Checklist (MPDC) Descriptive Phrases associated with 
this scale. These phrases have received a 
significantly greater endorsement by clinicians in 
describing patients with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder than the combined endorsement average for 
all other scales (Millon, 1987). The MPDC phrases 
for scale 6A that are directly related to deception, 
and thus highly relevant to the present study, 
include the following: lies for purpose of harming
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others, disregards the truth and repeatedly lies, 
interpersonal conduct: untrustworthy and unreliable,
self-image: perceived as shallow and lacking in
genuineness.
Three color videotapes were constructed, each 
containing eight different segments, four of which 
were "truth conditions" and four of which were "lie 
conditions". Each segment presented a different 
individual, or "actor". Actors included four males 
and four females. Each video segment contained 45 - 
60 seconds of verbalization between the experimenter 
and actor, who was either truthful or deceptive in 
describing a prior job that he or she has held. 
Several male and female actors recruited from UNLV 
introductory psychology courses were filmed, each in 
two conditions, a "truth" condition and a "lie" 
condition, providing a total of 24 video segments.
The truth condition consisted of each actor 
responding to questions posed by the experimenter 
concerning a job he or she has held within the last 
ten years. Actors listed several jobs they had held, 
and one was randomly chosen for them to describe.
The experimenter elicited information regarding how 
old the actors were at the time of employment, how 
long the employment lasted, what their job duties
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were, and whether they liked or disliked the job and 
why. The actors were given no time to practice the 
job description prior to the filming session.
The lie condition consisted of actors 
describing a fictitious job assigned to them by the 
experimenter. They were instructed to 
try to convince the viewer that they had actually 
held the job by answering questions posed by the 
experimenter concerning the following points : how
old they were at the time of employment, how long the 
employment lasted, what their job duties were, and 
whether they liked or disliked the job and why. The 
actors were given no time to practice the job 
description prior to the filming session.
Half of the actors were randomly chosen to 
participate in the truth condition first, and the 
remaining half participated in the lie condition 
first. Each actor was filmed from the waist up, in a 
sitting position, with the camera placed directly in 
front of them; the experimenter was not visible. The 
same camera angle was used for each actor, as well as 
a standardized backdrop. Additionally, each actor 
completed the antisocial personality scale (Millon, 
1990). After all actors were filmed, eight were 
randomly chosen to appear on the videotapes. Three
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tapes were then constructed, each with eight 
segments, presenting the actors in different order 
and different conditions (i.e. truth or lie 
condition).
A final stimulus material presented to subjects 
was a dichotomous adjective checklist to assess 
various subject perceptions of the actors on 
videotape. All subjects received a handout 
containing an adjective checklist for each video, 
pertaining to various actor personality 
characteristics (see Appendix II). Accurate 
deception detection was assessed according to subject 
response to the "truthful/untruthful" item, and its 
correspondence with actual truth or deception. This 
item appeared randomly among the other adjectives. 
Pretest of Stimulus Materials
A pretest of fourteen participants was conducted 
in order to determine if the suspicion manipulation 
would be effective. Seven subjects were given the 
low suspicion instructions : "This is a study
designed to evaluate first impressions. You will see 
a series of individuals on videotape, and after each 
segment, you will be asked to describe the person you 
just saw by responding to the attached adjective 
checklist". Seven subjects were given the moderate
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suspicion instructions: "This is a study designed to
evaluate first impressions. You will see a series of 
individuals on videotape, and after each segment, you 
will be asked to describe the person you just saw by 
responding to the attached adjective checklist. As 
you view the tape, keep in mind that the people you 
see may not be completely truthful in what they're 
saying" (McComack & Levine, 1990) . After viewing 
the videotape and completing the adjective checklist, 
subjects were asked to rate their degree of suspicion 
on a scale from 1 (no suspicion) to 9 (extreme 
suspicion). It was found that subjects who were 
given instructions designed to evoke moderate 
suspicion did manifest a higher level of suspicion 
(mean = 5.71) than subjects given instructions 
designed to evoke no suspicion (mean = 3.14). A one­
way analysis of variance found the difference between 
means to be significant, F, (1,12) = 6.557, p = .02. 
Had the different instructions indicated no effect on 
suspicion, a new method of inducing suspicion would 
have been developed. Since the suspicion 
manipulation proved to be effective, pretest data was 
also used as subject data.
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Procedure
Following the development of the stimulus 
materials, 121 subjects were recruited under the 
cover story that they would be participating in a 
study designed to evaluate first impressions. All 
subjects completed the antisocial personality scale 
before viewing the videotape. A median split based 
on subject antisocial personality traits scores 
(median = 29) was used to create the high and low 
antisocial categories^.
 ̂ The statistical analyses performed on the data were originally conducted using 
extreme groups for the antisocial variable; the 40 subjects obtaining the highest scores 
were to comprise the high antisocial category, and the 40 subjects obtaining the lowest 
scores were to comprise the low antisocial category. All analyses performed using this 
division of the antisocial variable revealed nonsignificant results. That is, differences 
between the high and low antisocial categories were nonsignificant when suspicion, 
veracity judgments, and deception detection accuracy were examined. There are 
several plausible explanations for this finding.
One possibility is that the use of the aforementioned "extreme groups" were 
not extreme enough to find differences between the two categories. Perhaps the gap 
between the high and low groups was simply not wide enough. This explanation is 
possible, but not likely considering the fact that several statistical analyses performed 
using a median split, obviously entailing less extreme groups, yielded significant 
differences between high and low antisocials along the variables of suspicion and 
veracity judgments.
Another possible explanation is that the true relationship between varying 
levels of antisocial personality traits and suspicion, veracity judgments, and/or 
detection accuracy is curvilinear. It is likely that a highly complex relationship exists 
between these variables that would require examining the antisocial variable in 1/3's, 
and comparing all three groups, rather than just the extremes. For instance, 
individuals in the middle antisocial category could manifest more suspicion than 
individuals in the high or low antisocial categories.
The most plausible explanation for the lack of statistical significance between 
the two antisocial groups is that the sample size was too small. Perhaps a sample size
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
Since subjects were likely to demonstrate a 
truth bias and assume that actors were being 
truthful, three variations of the original videotape 
were used, each presenting the same actors in 
opposite conditions and in different order. In this 
way, if subjects did have extremely high or low 
accuracies for certain conditions, it could be 
determined whether this was due to a truth bias or to 
the actors themselves being too easy or difficult to 
detect. Actors that produced average accuracy scores 
under 25% or over 75% were to be seen as too 
difficult or too easy to detect, respectively. These 
cutoffs were to control for floor and ceiling 
effects, and were to provide an adequate range for 
subject accuracy comparison. Actor segments that 
were found to be too easy or too difficult were to be 
discarded, and the "backup" actor segments were to be 
utilized. It was found that the original actors were 
appropriate, creating subject accuracy scores between 
25% and 75%. Additionally, a three-factor analysis
of 180 would have been large enough to allow ample power to reveal a significant 
difference between the top one-third and bottom one-third subjects.
Regardless of the true reason(s) behind the lack of significance using extreme 
groups divided by one-thirds, it seemed inappropriate to terminate the statistical 
analyses at this point, so further analyses were performed using a median split of the 
antisocial variable. The results and discussion sections therefore concern results found 
with the latter division of the antisocial variable.
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of variance (high/low antisocial vs. high/low 
suspicion vs. videotape) found that the use of 
different videotapes did not significantly affect 
subject accuracy.
Suspicion Manipulation
Subjects were randomly assigned to either a low 
suspicion condition or a moderate suspicion 
condition. In the low suspicion condition, subjects 
received the following instructions prior to viewing 
the videotape: "This is a study designed to evaluate
first impressions. You will see a series of 
individuals on videotape, and after each segment, you 
will be asked to describe the person you just saw by 
responding to the attached adjective checklist."
In the moderate suspicion condition, subjects 
received the following instructions prior to viewing 
the videotape: "This is a study designed to evaluate
first impressions. You will see a series of 
individuals on videotape, and after each segment, you 
will be asked to describe the person you just saw by 
responding to the attached adjective checklist. As 
you view the tape, keep in mind that the people you 
see may not be completely truthful in what they're 
saying" (McCornack & Levine, 1990).
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After receiving the instructions, subjects 
viewed the videotape, which randomly presented each 
actor. After each segment, participants were 
allotted two minutes to complete the adjective 
checklist (see Appendix II). At the end of the 
session, a manipulation check was included to 
determine if subject suspicion varied as a function 
of the appropriate experimental condition (i.e. 
different instructions) . Subjects were asked to rate 
their degree of suspicion on a scale from 1 (no 
suspicion) to 9 (extreme suspicion). Finally, 
subjects were debriefed as to the actual intentions 
and nature of the research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS
A number of statistical analyses were conducted. 
First, effectiveness of the suspicion manipulation 
was determined for the entire study, for both trait 
suspicion (i.e. antisocial personality traits) and 
state suspicion. Second, veracity judgments were 
analyzed in order to ascertain if the suspicion 
manipulation and/or level of antisocial personality 
traits affected subjects' judgments of truthfulness. 
Finally, deception detection accuracy was 
investigated to determine if subject suspicion and/or 
level of antisocial personality traits affected 
actual detection accuracy.
Half of the total subjects participated in the 
study in a moderate suspicion condition, and half 
participated in a low suspicion condition. All 
subjects completed the antisocial personality traits 
scale (Millon, 1990). The lowest antisocial score
38
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obtained was 3, the highest score was 58, the median 
was 29, and the mean was 29.719, SD = 10.63. A near­
perfect normal disribution was obtained for the 
antisocial variable.
Suspicion Manipulation
Subject suspicion was examined in the context of 
state suspicion and trait suspicion (i.e. antisocial 
personality traits). It was hypothesized 
that individuals high in antisocial personality 
traits would be more suspicious than individuals low 
in antisocial personality traits, and individuals in 
the moderate suspicion condition would be more 
suspicious than individuals in the low suspicion 
condition. When scores from the 9-point suspicion 
scale were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low suspicion) x 
2 (high vs. low antisocial traits) ANOVA, the expected 
main effects were obtained. These two expected 
effects were found to be significant; Antisocial, F, 
(1, 117) = 7.424, p = .007; Suspicion, F, (1, 117) = 
8.473, p = .004 (see Figure 1). No significant 
interaction between antisocial personality traits and 
suspicion was found.
Veracity Judgments
Veracity judgments were analyzed in order to 
ascertain if antisocial personality traits and/or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
State suspicion affected subjects' judgments of 
truthfulness, irrespective of actual detection 
accuracy. Veracity judgments were computed by 
summing the number of times each subject circled the 
"truthful" item in the adjective checklist handout, 
thus subjects could receive a maximum of eight total 
veracity judgments. It was hypothesized that 
individuals low in antisocial personality traits and 
low in suspicion would have more judgments of 
truthfulness than individuals in the other groups. 
Conversely, individuals high in antisocial 
personality traits and individuals who were primed to 
be moderately suspicious were expected to have fewer 
judgments of truthfulness than individuals in the 
other groups. Subjects who were primed to be 
moderately suspicious had a mean veracity level of 
6.183, SD = 1.48; subjects who were not primed to be 
suspicious had a mean veracity level of 6.885, SD = 
1.34. An analysis of variance found a significant 
main effect for suspicion, with those individuals who 
were primed to be moderately suspicious manifesting a 
significantly higher number of judgments of deception 
than individuals who were not primed to be 
suspicious, F, (1,117) = 8.08, p = .005. The main 
effect for antisocial personality traits was
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nonsignificant, as was the interaction between 
suspicion and antisocial personality traits.
When gender was examined in conjunction with 
suspicion condition and antisocial personality traits 
using a 2 (high vs . low suspcion) x 2 (high vs. low 
antisocial traits) x 2 (male vs. female) ANOVA, a 
three-factor interaction was found, P, (1, 113) = 
8.332, p= .005 ^ . For males, as suspicion went from 
"low" to "moderate", veracity judgments tended to 
decrease for individuals low in antisocial 
personality traits, and stayed the same for 
individuals high in antisocial personality traits, F, 
(1,113) = 2.91, p= .09 (see Figure 2). For females, 
as suspicion went from "low" to "moderate", veracity 
judgments tended to decrease for individuals high in 
antisocial personality traits and stayed the same for 
individuals low in antisocial personality traits, F, 
(1, 113) = 6.33, p= .01 (see Figure 3).
Deception.Detection Accuracy
Deception detection accuracy was assessed 
according to subject response to the 
"truthful/untruthful" item on the adjective 
checklist, and its correspondence with actual truth
2lt should be noted that gender was also added to the other analyses reported, but in 
these analyses it was not involved with any significant effects.
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or deception. Subjects received one point for 
correctly responding to each video segment, thus each 
subject could receive a maximum of eight points for 
the entire videotape. Each subject's total number 
correct was divided by eight to obtain their video 
accuracy score. The minimum score received by any 
subject was 25%, the maximum score was 100%, and the 
mean score of all subjects was 54%, similar to the 
findings of many other studies conducting deception 
research (i.e. Lavrakas & Maier, 1979, 54 percent ; 
Matarazzo et al., 1970, 59 percent).
Subject detection accuracy was examined in order 
to determine if suspicion and/or antisocial 
personality traits affected subject detection 
accuracy. It was hypothesized that individuals low 
in antisocial personality traits who were primed to
be moderately suspicious and individuals high in
antisocial personality traits who were not primed to 
be suspicious would manifest a superior accuracy in 
detecting deception than individuals in all other 
groups. Persons low in antisocial personality traits 
who were not primed to be suspicious and persons high
in antisocial personality traits who were primed to
be moderately suspicious were expected to possess 
poor deception detection accuracy in relation to
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individuals in the other groups. When accuracy 
scores were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low suspicion)
X 2 (high vs. low antisocial traits) ANOVA, the main 
effects for antisocial personality traits and 
suspicion were nonsignificant, as was the interaction 
between suspicion and antisocial personality traits.




The suspicion manipulation was found to be 
effective, causing those individuals in the moderate 
suspicion condition to manifest a significantly 
higher level of suspicion than those individuals in 
the no suspicion condition. This finding replicates 
that found by McComack and Levine (1990) , when using 
the same instructions to induce a moderate level of 
suspicion, they also found the manipulation to be 
effective.
The more interesting finding concerning 
suspicion is the confirmation of the hypothesis that 
persons high in antisocial personality traits would 
manifest higher levels of suspicion than persons low 
in antisocial traits. One explanation for this 
"trait suspicion" concerns the "projection" 
rationale. Since antisocial individuals are 
notorious for lying, and they frequently use, con.
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
and deceive others, they may have a tendency to 
project their own deceitfulness onto other people 
(Field, 1986) , An individual who assumes others are 
generally dishonest is an individual who tends to be 
distrustful of other people, which by definition, 
constitutes one who is suspicious of others. In sum, 
persons high in antisocial personality traits 
frequently deceive others, project this behavior onto 
other people, and therefore are distrustful and 
suspicious of others.
Another reason why individuals high in 
antisocial traits may be suspicious of others is that 
many of them have come from "broken, impoverished 
homes and have experienced some form of parental loss 
and rejection..." (Hare, 1970, p. 109). Depending on 
the severity of the situation, growing up in an 
unstable, unpredictable environment would tend to 
create a certain level of distrust in a person, not 
only for the environment in general, but also for 
people in general. Having learned that the 
environment is unstable and people cannot be trusted, 
it logically follows that antisocial individuals 
would generally be wary of their surroundings and 
suspicious of other people. The finding of trait 
suspicion in the present study replicated that found
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by Ekselius (1994), who also discovered evidence for 
the existence of trait suspicion for antisocial 
individuals.
Further, the main effects found for suspicion 
condition (i.e. state suspicion) and antisocial 
personality traits (i.e. trait suspicion) on 
reported subject suspicion level seem to support an 
additive relationship between various types of 
suspicion (see Figure 1). This also provides support 
for McCornack and Levine's (1990) criticism of the 
"all-or-none" approach to operationalizing suspicion. 
The present study and McComack and Levine's (1990) 
study both provide support for the existence of 
various levels of suspicion, that it should not be 
conceptualized simply by its existence or 
nonexistence. It seems that a complex interplay 
between person variables and situation variables can 
modify a person's overall level of suspicion. Future 
researchers should perhaps consider dealing with 
suspicion in a different manner, rather than 
operationalizing it dichotomously.
Yexa.ci.ty - Judgments
One of the original hypotheses regarding 
veracity judgments was supported in the present 
study. It was hypothesized that veracity judgments
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of those who were low in suspicion would be more 
truthful than veracity judgments of those who were 
moderately suspicious. A significant difference was 
found between the two suspicion conditions, in 
support of the aforementioned hypothesis. This 
provides additional support that the suspicion 
manipulation worked well, causing individuals in the 
moderate suspicion condition to have fewer judgments 
of veracity than individuals who were not primed to 
be suspicious. This finding is similar to that found 
by Toris & DePaulo (1985) and Stiff, Kim, and Ramesh 
(1992), in that primed suspicion produces fewer 
j udgment s o f t  ruthfulne s s .
It was also hypothesized that persons high in 
antisocial traits would have fewer veracity judgments 
than persons low in antisocial traits. This was 
reasoned on the basis of the existence of trait 
suspicion in persons high in antisocial personality 
traits ; it was expected that individuals who were 
trait suspicious would make fewer veracity judgments 
than individuals who were not trait suspicious. This 
main effect, however puzzling, was not significant, 
and thus failed to support the hypothesis.
A possible reason for the lack of significant 
differences in veracity judgments between individuals
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
high and low in antisocial personality traits is that 
perhaps in this experimental situation, trait 
suspicion was just simply not as powerful in 
affecting subject judgments as was state suspicion 
(or lack of). Perhaps the situation was more likely 
to dictate cognitions/behavior than were underlying 
personality traits. In forming veracity judgments, 
several factors come into play, including personality 
of the detector, personality of the deceiver, and 
factors concerning the situation under which the 
deception occurs. Without a reason to believe the 
actors would be lying, persons high in antisocial 
traits could have been more influenced by the 
situation (i.e. "This is just a psychology 
experiment...") than by an underlying trait of 
suspicion (i.e. "I wonder if these people are 
lying..."). Therefore, although these individuals 
felt suspicious of the actors, perhaps they did not 
feel strong enough about their suspicion to judge the 
actors as being untruthful.
Gender was found to have no significant main 
effect on veracity judgments, consistent with results 
found in other studies (see Zuckerman, et al., 1981; 
McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff et al., 1992).
However, a significant interaction was found between
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gender, suspicion, and antisocial personality traits 
(see Figures 2 and 3). As suspicion increased for 
low antisocial males, veracity judgments decreased; 
as suspicion increased for high antisocial females, 
veracity judgments decreased. As suspicion 
increases, veracity judgments should, in theory, 
decrease for all subjects, not just low antisocial 
males and high antisocial females. So the peculiar 
finding is that veracity judgments stayed the same as 
suspicion increased for high antisocial males and low 
antisocial females.
A possible reason for this finding with females 
is that women who are low in antisocial personality 
traits may be more trusting than men who are low in 
such traits, and therefore, even when primed to 
become suspicious, such women do not make fewer 
veracity judgments. Perhaps these women are so 
lacking in trait suspicion that it would take a 
stronger suspicion manipulation to increase their 
judgments of deception.
A possible explanation for this finding with 
males is that men who are high in antisocial 
personality traits may be less influenced by or more 
oppositional towards the instructions designed to 
decrease their veracity judgments than their female
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counterparts. Since these men did not exhibit a 
floor effect with veracity judgments, it is not the 
case that they were so highly suspicious that they 
couldn't make fewer veracity judgments. This finding 
makes the interaction very difficult to explain. 
Deception Detection Accuracy
None of the original hypotheses concerning 
detection accuracy were supported. That is, 
suspicion, antisocial personality traits, and the 
interaction between the two had no effect on actual 
detection accuracy. There are several possible 
explanations for the lack of significant differences 
in accuracy between individuals with various levels 
of suspicion.
It has often been hypothesized in deception 
research that suspicious individuals become more 
attentive to cues that should enhance their deception 
detection success (Toris & DePaulo, 1985). One 
possible reason this did not occur in the present 
study is that such cues to deception may not have 
been attended to by the subjects. A main reason for 
this is that subjects may not have been motivated to 
correctly detect deception (Zuckerman et al., 1981). 
To illustrate, subjects were not even aware of the 
actual nature of research until they were debriefed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
They were under the impression they were 
participating in a study designed to evaluate first 
impressions, so they weren't necessarily looking for 
cues to deception, and consequently didn't find them. 
Subjects also may not have been highly motivated to 
detect deception accurately because they had no real 
incentive to; participants were not rewarded in any 
way for correctly ascertaining deception.
Another possible reason suspicious subjects did 
not successfully utilize leaked cues is that perhaps 
they relied on false cues to deception. There exists 
several discrepancies between actual cues to 
deception and perceived cues to deception, such as 
when the deceiver shifts posture often, smiles less, 
gazes less, takes longer to answer a question, and 
speaks slower (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Subjects who 
viewed such cues as being actual cues to deception 
would have more than likely incorrectly assessed 
deception, thereby lowering overall accuracy.
Assuming individuals high in antisocial 
personality traits are more suspicious than those low 
in antisocial personality traits, the aforementioned 
reasons could also be used as possible explanations 
for the lack of significant differences between the 
antisocial groups. Putting this aside, another
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possible reason no group differences were found is 
that we really weren't looking at groups that were 
extreme enough when divided by the median split to 
demonstrate an effect for the antisocial variable.
But even when the subjects were divided into one- 
thirds, no effect was found for extreme groups along 
the antisocial variable. Consider the possibility 
that an effect for this variable cannot be found 
within a student population. In other words, running 
more subjects and examining more extreme groups may 
not find an effect, either. Perhaps a significant 
effect would only be found for true antisocial 
individuals (i.e. those diagnosed with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder), not just those high in 
antisocial personality traits.
Along with the main effects for suspicion and 
antisocial personality traits, the interaction 
between these variables proved to be nonsignificant 
as well. One reason that has already been discussed 
concerns subject failure to successfully utilize 
deception cues, thereby producing no effect for 
suspicion on accuracy. A second possible explanation 
is that the relationship between trait suspicion, 
assuming it exists for those high in antisocial 
personality traits, and state suspicion is very
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complex. Although it may be additive in nature, 
assigning weights to each is clearly an imprecise, 
subjective task. Additionally, deception detection 
itself is very complex, requiring substantial 
interplay between person variaüDles and situation 
variables; accurately pinpointing how much effect one 
factor had versus another is a highly convoluted 
process.
Methodological weaknesses of this study include 
a non-representative sample, reliance on a self- 
report antisocial measure (MCMI-II), and the use of 
only two levels of state suspicion. The sample 
chosen for the study consisted solely of University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduates. It was hoped 
that among such individuals, a large spread of 
antisocial scores would be obtained. Although the 
spread seemed appropriate, the maximum score obtained 
on the antisocial measure was 58, just below the 
median base rate score for psychiatric patients on 
this scale. Although the aim of the study was not 
necessarily to utilize truly antisocial individuals, 
the sample could have been at least more 
representative of such persons.
Additionally, reliance on the self-report 
measure, the MCMI-II, may not have elicited complete
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honesty from participants. Subjects may have felt 
uncomfortable about responding truthfully to some of 
the items (see Appendix I) , and therefore may have 
prevented us from obtaining a true picture of 
antisocial traits within the sample.
Another methodological weakness includes the 
reliance on only two levels of state suspicion.
Three levels of primed suspicion may have provided a 
more complete picture of the effects of state 
suspicion on reported suspicion level, veracity 
judgments, and deception detection accuracy. It also 
may have shed more light on the relationship between 
trait suspicion and state suspicion.
In summary, this study replicates previous 
studies regarding the finding of evidence for trait 
suspicion among persons high in antisocial 
personality traits, the lack of effect for suspicion 
on deception detection accuracy, and the overall 
finding that humans are relatively poor detectors of 
deception. One suggestion for future research 
includes using a larger sample size, which would 
allow the possibility of finding significant 
differences between persons of differing age and 
ethnicity. Such differences could possibly be found 
when examining antisocial scores, trait suspicion.
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veracity judgments, and/or detection accuracy. 
Additionally, in light of the widespread occurence 
and substantial impact of deception on personal 
interactions, a paramount direction for future 
research lies in improving human ability to detect 
deception.
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APPENDIX
PERSONALITY TRAITS SCALE
GENDER : AGE : RACE :
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions
TRUE or FALSE. If you agree with a statement or feel 
that it describes you, answer TRUE. If you disagree 
with a statement or feel that it does not describe 
you, answer FALSE. Please try to answer every 
question.
1. I always follow my own ideas rather than do what 
others expect of m e .
2. As a teenager, I got into lots of trouble because 
of bad school behavior.
3. Sometimes I can be pretty rough and mean in my 
relations with my family.
4. I know I'm a superior person, so I don't care 
what people think.
5. I will often do things for no reason other than 
they might be fun.
6. If my family puts pressure on me. I'm likely to 
feel angry and resist doing what they want.
56
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7. I protect myself from trouble by never letting 
people know much about me.
8. Other people get more angry about bothersome 
things than I do.
9. Under no circumstances do I ever let myself be 
tricked by people who say they need help.
10. In the past I've gotten involved sexually with 
many people who didn't matter much to me.
11. I am a very agreeable and submissive person.
12. My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my 
troubles.
13. I don't mind bullying others to get them to do 
what I want.
14. I like to flirt with members of the opposite 
sex.
15. I strongly resent "big shots" who always think 
they can do things better than I can.
16. If someone criticized me for making a mistake, I 
would quickly point out some of that person's 
mistakes.
17. I've done a number of stupid things on impulse 
that ended up causing me great trouble.
18. I never forgive an insult or forget an 
embarrassment that someone caused me.
19. I am the sort of person that others take 
advantage of.
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20. I always try hard to please others, even when I 
dislike them.
21. I quickly figure out how people are trying to 
cause me trouble.
22. I've always had less interest in sex than most 
people do.
23. Since I was a child, I have always had to watch 
out for people who were trying to cheat me.
24. When things get boring, I like to stir up some 
excitement.
25. I have an alcohol problem that has made 
difficulties for me and ray family.
26. I don't see anything wrong with using people to 
get what I want.
27. Punishment never stopped me from doing what I 
wanted.
28. I ran away from home as a teenager at least 
once.
29. I don't know why, but I sometimes say cruel 
things just to make others unhappy.
30. I speak out my opinions about things no matter 
what others may think.
31. When someone in authority insists that I do 
something. I'm likely to put it off or do it poorly 
on purpose.
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32. I use my charm to get the attention of other 
people.
33. I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I'm 
going in life.
34. I've been unfairly punished by the law for 
crimes I never committed.
35. I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of 
someone who allows it.
36. I've changed jobs more than three times in the
last couple of years.
37. My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to 
family arguments.
38. There are members of my family who say I'm 
selfish and think only of myself.
39. Frankly, I lie quite often to get out of 
trouble.
40. My parents often told me that I was no good.
41. On occasion I have had as many as ten or more 
drinks without becoming drunk.
42. I used to be really restless, traveling around 
from place to place with no idea of where I would end 
up.
43. I get very irritated if someone demands that I 
do things his way rather than my own.
44. People who I admired greatly at first have often 
become real disappointments to me later.
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45. I'm the kind of person who can walk up to anyone 
and tell him or her off.
Note■ From the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory- 
II, by T. Millon, 1990, Minneapolis, MN: National
Computer Systems, Inc.
Copyright 1990 by Theodore Millon, PhD.
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APPENDIX II
ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST
INSTRUCTIONS : Please circle one number in each pair
of adjectives that most accurately describes the 































Figure 1. Mean repeated suspicion level for subjects high and low in antisocial traits in 
the iow and moderate suspicion conditions.
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Figure 2. Mean veracity judgments for males high and low in antisociai traits in the iow 
and moderate suspicion conditions.
















Figure 3. Mean veracity judgments for females high and low in antisocial traits in the 
low and moderate suspicion conditions.
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APPENDIX IV
HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTOCOL FORM





Barbara SchoephOerster (PSY) 
M/S 5030
\filliam E. Schulze, Director 
^tfffice of Sponsored Programs (X1357)
(' Status of Human Sub]ect Protocol Entitled: 
"Individual Differences in the Detection of 
Inaccurate Information"
OSP #113s0995-056e
The protocol for the project referenced above has been reviewed by 
the Office of Sponsored Programs, and it has been determined that 
it meets the criteria for exemption from full review by the UNLV 
human subjects Instititnal Review Board. Except for any required 
conditions or modifications noted below, this protocol is approved 
for a period of one year from the date of this notification, and 
work on the project may proceed.
Should the use of human subjects described in this protocol 
continue beyond a year from the date of this notification, it will 
be necessary to request an extension.
cc: M Millar (PSY-5030)
OSP File
Office of Sponsored Programs 
4505 Maryland Parkway •  Box 451037 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-1037 
(702) 895-1357 • FAX (702) 895-4242
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